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Structural Priming as Implicit Learning: A
Comparison of Models of Sentence Production
Franklin Chang,1,3 Gary S. Dell,1 Kathryn Bock,1 and 
Zenzi M. Griffin2
Structural priming reflects a tendency to generalize recently spoken or heard syntactic structures
to different utterances. We propose that it is a form of implicit learning. To explore this hypothesis,
we developed and tested a connectionist model of language production that incorporated mecha-
nisms previously used to simulate implicit learning. In the model, the mechanism that learned to
produce structured sequences of phrases from messages also exhibited structural priming. The abil-
ity of the model to account for structural priming depended on representational assumptions about
the nature of messages and the relationship between comprehension and production. Modeling
experiments showed that comprehension-based representations were important for the model’s gen-
eralizations in production and that nonatomic message representations allowed a better fit to exist-
ing data on structural priming than traditional thematic-role representations.
When we talk, we have to create syntactic structures. How we do this is
important for understanding sentence production. In this paper, we argue
that the process of creating structure is affected by adaptations to experience
within the production system. That is, the production system learns. We
address this claim through the computational modeling of structural prim-
ing, looking at how alternative representations influence structural variations.
Structural priming is a tendency to use similar syntactic structures in
successive clauses or sentences (Bock, 1986; Bock & Loebell, 1990). For
example, in primed picture description, speakers who first produce a prepo-
sitional-dative sentence (e.g., “The girl showed a picture to the teacher”)
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ing a guitar to the singer.” Speakers who first produce a double-object struc-
ture (“The girl showed the teacher a picture”) are later likely to say “The
boy is giving the singer a guitar” (see Fig. 2, left side). Structural priming also
occurs with active and passive transitive sentences (see Fig. 2, right side).
Structural priming has been attributed to some kind of syntactic
process (e.g., Bock & Loebell, 1990; Hartsuiker, Kolk, & Huiskamp, 1999;
Pickering & Branigan, 1998). By syntactic, we mean the processes respon-
sible for mapping the elements of messages into linguistically coded struc-
tures and sequences. Some evidence for the syntactic nature of structural
priming comes from comparisons of sentences with similar surface con-
figurations, but different thematic compositions (Bock & Loebell, 1990,
Experiments 1 and 2). Prepositional locatives (e.g., “The wealthy woman
drove the Mercedes to the church”) are as effective as prepositional datives
(“The wealthy woman gave the Mercedes to the church”) at priming prepo-
sitional datives (see Fig. 2, left side), and intransitive locatives (e.g., “The
747 was landing by the control tower”) are as effective as passives (“The 747
was alerted by the control tower”) at priming passives (see Fig. 2, right
side). In both cases, although the primes differ thematically, their syntactic
structures are the same. Priming also occurs despite differences between
primes and targets in function words (Bock, 1989) and differences in the
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Fig. 1. Example dative picture.animacy of subjects and objects (Bock, Loebell, & Morey, 1992). It does
not occur when the structure of the prime changes, even if the order of words
in the prime stays the same (Bock & Loebell, 1990, Experiment 3). A parsi-
monious explanation for all of these results is that structural priming involves
the surface syntactic configuration.
In the present work, we address the mechanism that leads to struc-
tural priming. One hypothesis is that it is a short-term memory or activation
effect. If so, structural priming should dissipate with time or interference.
However, it lasts a fairly long time: Bock and Griffin (in press) found struc-
tural priming over 10 intervening sentences, Boyland and Anderson (1992)
found priming when primes and targets were separated by 20 min, and
Saffran and Martin (1997) found structural priming over as long as a week
for aphasic patients. There is some evidence that priming is sometimes short-
lived (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, in press; Levelt & Kelter, 1982), but
insofar as its effects can persist, activation cannot be the only mechanism
at work.
STRUCTURAL PRIMING AS IMPLICIT LEARNING
We hypothesize that structural priming is a form of implicit learning.
The persistence of priming over intervening sentences implicates a longer-
term change to the production system whose function may be to tune the
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Fig. 2. Structural priming in Bock and Loebell (1990, Experiments 1 and 2).system to experience. The learning is implicit, because it involves inciden-
tal learning of complex, abstract relations during the performance of a task,
yielding knowledge that is inaccessible to consciousness (Seger, 1994).
The model of structural priming that we are developing reflects this
hypothesis. The best models of implicit learning of sequences are a class 
of connectionist models called simple recurrent networks (Cleeremans &
McClelland, 1991; Seger, 1994). Experimentally, implicit sequential learning
is tested by having people respond quickly to series of stimuli that follow cer-
tain patterns. Like people, the models learn to be sensitive to the patterns. The
models do so because they can use their past states as the context for predic-
tions. When the predictions fail, the models make changes to the weights in
the network by backpropagation. These weight changes are the hypothetical
basis for implicit learning.
Because simple recurrent networks have also been used to model the
learning of structural dependencies (Elman, 1990, 1993), our first step in
implementing the learning account of structural priming was to adapt a sim-
ple recurrent network to the task of sentence production. We focused on one
of the likely components of priming. The component has to do with the order
of constituents in sentences, or what plays the role of subject, direct object,
prepositional object, etc. (Bock, Loebell, & Morey, 1992). We explored two
questions about the nature of the representations and mappings that guide
this process. The first concerns the relationship between comprehension
and production. What representations or processes, if any, do they have in
common? The second question is about the conceptual input to production,
sometimes called the message. Although the message gets production started,
it has rarely been studied (but see Griffin & Bock, in press).
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Fig. 3. Structural priming over lags of 0 and 10 intervening sentences 
(from Bock & Griffin, in press).The model was taught to map a message into a sequence of words, one
word at a time, and trained to produce sequences analogous to those used
in structural priming experiments. Table I shows the types of sequences, an
example of each type, the frames that the sequences adhered to, and the
percentage of each sequence in training. The verbs associated with each
sequence type are given as well. The nouns were restricted in three ways.
First, recipients in dative sequences were animate (or construable as sen-
tient; Gropen et al., 1989). Second, agents in passive sequences were pre-
dominantly inanimate and patients were predominantly animate (Bock, 1986;
Ferreira, 1994). Third, experiencers in theme-experiencer sequences were
predominantly animate (Ferreira, 1994).
A backpropagation algorithm was used both to train the model and to
implement priming. The model was first trained to produce many examples
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Table I. Sequences in the Training Corpus
Frequency Sentence construction
Sequence structure in training (%)a Example sentence Verb set
Intransitives 16 AGENT VERB 
cats walk.
walk live see hear
Active transitives 16 AGENT VERB PATIENT 
cats chase dogs.
chase feed see hear make write
Passive transitives 4 PATIENT AUX PASTPART by AGENT
dogs are chased by cats.
chase feed see hear make write
Locative 16 AGENT AUX PRESPART PREP LOCATION
cats are walking near dogs.
walk live see hear
Active theme-experiencer 8 THEME VERB EXPERIENCER.
cats scare dogs.
scare thrill
Passive theme-experiencer 8 EXPERIENCER AUX PASTPART by THEME.
dogs are scared by cats.
scare thrill
Prepositional dative 8 AGENT VERB PATIENT PREP GOAL.
girls give cats to boys.
give make show write
Double-object dative 16 AGENT VERB GOAL PATIENT.
girls give boys cats.
give make show write
Prepositional locative 8 AGENT VERB PATIENT PREP LOCATION.
cats chase dogs near cars.
chase feed see hear
a Frequency in training approximated real-world frequencies.of each sequence type. Then, to simulate priming, we had the model produce
a prime sequence with learning “on,” leading to weight changes in the net-
work. These weight changes subsequently biased the production of a similar
structure, yielding priming. So the same mechanism, weight change, sup-
ported both the learning of the mapping system and the priming of sequences.
Important to the performance of the model were two representational
assumptions embedded in the model architecture. We will discuss these
assumptions before reporting the model’s performance.
The Comprehension Assumption
The comprehension assumption is that the production process uses
knowledge from comprehension. A growing body of evidence shows that
simply comprehending a sentence creates structural priming in production
(see Pickering et al., this issue). This has been found in tasks involving sen-
tence recall (Potter & Lombardi, 1998), dialogue (Pickering et al., this
issue), and picture description (Bock, in preparation).
To evaluate the comprehension assumption, we compared a model whose
context representation was derived solely from sequence production with a
model containing an additional context that came from a separate simple recur-
rent network trained for comprehension (Fig. 4). The comprehension network
was first trained to map sequences of words into a static message representa-
tion. The full model was then trained to produce sequences under the influence
of the dynamic context from comprehension. For simplicity, separate units
were used for comprehension and production, although this does not reflect a
commitment to separate representations (see Pickering et al., this issue).
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Fig. 4. The architecture of the model with comprehension-based representations. The production-
only model excluded the comprehension component (in the box).The Message Assumption
In the model, messages were framed in terms drawn from theories that
represent argument structures with semantic primitives like cause, sentience,
motion, and existence (Dowty, 1991). This contrasts with traditional views
of thematic roles (Fillmore, 1968), where the arguments of an event are
classified into a fixed set of atomic roles like agent, patient, goal, location,
and so on.
Three ideas from the nonatomic approach are particularly relevant to the
model. First, Jackendoff (1990) argued for a tier account of thematic roles
that incorporates both action (causal) and aspect (perspective) components.
In this system, in “Sue threw the ball,” Sue is simultaneously the agent (the
cause of the event) and the source (the initial location of the ball). These two
tiers were represented in the model with slots for aspect (source, theme,
goal) and features within each slot for action information, like sentience.
Concretely, this eliminates atomic roles like location and allows recipients to
be distinguished from locations by a feature within the goal slot.
A second important idea is Levin and Hovav’s (1996) distinction
between internal and external causes. Roughly speaking, this divides agents
into those that act on others (external causes) and those that act on them-
selves (internal causes). We implemented this by putting internal causes
into the theme slot and external causes into the source slot. Concretely, this
means that intransitive and locative agents were themes in the model.
Finally, modern theories claim that semantic features guide argument
selection (Dowty, 1991). We implemented this by making structure selection
dependent on the activation of causal features, such as sentience. With a
sentient goal, a double-object dative was produced; otherwise, a preposi-
tional dative was produced. Table II shows the positions of the arguments in
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Table II. Nonatomic Message Representation
Message slota
Sequence structure Sourcea Theme Goal
Intransitives AGENT SNTI
Active transitives AGENT SNTI PATIENT snti
Passive transitives AGENT SNTI PATIENT SNTI
Locative AGENT SNTI LOCATION
Active theme-experience THEME snti EXPERIENCER snti
Passive theme-experience THEME snti EXPERIENCER SNTI
Double-object dative AGENT SNTI PATIENT GOAL SNTI
Prepositional dative AGENT SNTI PATIENT GOAL snti
Prepositional locative AGENT SNTI PATIENT LOCATION
a SNTI, denotes sentience; upper and lower case represents full and partial activation, respectively.this kind of representation, with SNTI indicating the sentience of the concept,
and upper and lower case indicating more and less activation, respectively.
MODEL TESTS
Six training sets were created, composed of sequences like those in
Table I. We manipulated two factors to test the comprehension and message
assumptions. The comprehension factor had two levels, one for a model
with only a production component and the second for a model with both a
comprehension and a production component.
The message factor also had two levels, corresponding to the model
with nonatomic message roles and a model with atomic thematic roles. The
atomic-role view was instantiated with a separate slot in the message for
each thematic role, using the relative activation of the concept in each slot
to select structures. For example, if the goal was more active than the
patient, a double-object dative was produced; otherwise, a prepositional
dative was produced. Table III depicts this kind of representation.
The resulting 2 ´ 2 design had six model-subjects per cell. For testing,
192 prime and target pairs were created for each of four priming conditions
(dative-dative, prepositional locative-dative, transitive-transitive, locative-
transitive). These four conditions include the standard priming tests with
dative and transitive primes and targets, as well as two conditions from Bock
and Loebell (1990) to assess whether prepositional locatives would prime
prepositional datives and passives. In order to measure priming, two crite-
ria had to be met. First, prime sequences had to be produced correctly. To
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Table III. Atomic Message Representation
Message slota
Sequence structure Agent Patient Goal Location
Intransitives AGENT
Active transitives AGENT patient
Passive transitives AGENT PATIENT
Locative AGENT LOCATION
Active theme-experience THEME experiencer
Passive theme-experience THEME EXPERIENCER
Double-object dative AGENT PATIENT GOAL
Prepositional dative AGENT PATIENT goal
Prepositional AGENT PATIENT LOCATION
Locative
a Upper and lower case represents full and partial activation, respectively.ensure this, primes were generated from a message that forced a particular
sequence, relying on the argument selection mechanisms described earlier.
Second, target sequences had to permit alternation between different struc-
tures. To enable this, messages for the targets were set to a state intermedi-
ate between the representations of the two target sequences. For example,
with the nonatomic message representation, this meant that the sentience fea-
ture of the goal argument for a dative target would have an “activation level”
intermediate between the levels for double object and prepositional datives.
Analyses of variance were performed with subject models as the ran-
dom factor. The dependent measure was the magnitude of the difference
between two alternative structures after priming by one of them, which we
call a priming score. For instance, dative priming was calculated by first
determining the proportion of prepositional-dative target sequences elicited
for each test message (relative to the total number of dative targets elicited)
when preceded by prepositional-dative primes or double-object-dative primes.
These proportions were averaged over items. The proportion of prepositional-
dative sequences produced after double-object dative primes was subtracted
from the proportion following prepositional dative primes. Thus, a positive
priming score means that more prepositional datives were produced after
prepositional-dative primes than after double-object primes.
Results
Comparing the models with and without context from comprehension,
we found more priming in models that incorporated a comprehension rep-
resentation of the priming sequences than in models that used only a pro-
duction representation (Fig. 5). This effect was significant [F(1, 20) = 5.05;
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Fig. 5. A comparison of a production-only model with the comprehension-plus-production model.p = .036]. Likewise, models with nonatomic message representations were
better at priming in three of the four conditions (Fig. 6), yielding a margin-
ally significant effect [F(1, 20) = 3.60; p = 0.072].
Despite its marginal statistical significance in the overall analysis, the
nonatomic representation was superior to the atomic representation in one
crucial respect. It produced significant locative-to-passive priming; the atomic
representation did not. We attribute this to the representation of locative
agents: In the nonatomic message representation, agents of locatives are
internal causes, and therefore more similar to patients in passives. Since
locative-to-passive priming is on its face difficult to reconcile with traditional
thematic-role representations, the advantage for nonatomic roles in this test
offers independent support for nonatomic role theories.
Putting together the comprehension representation and the nonatomic
messages yields a model that has at least some priming in all four of the prim-
ing tests. The priming effects are small, but are (marginally) significantly dif-
ferent from zero in one-tailed tests: datives [4.04% priming, t(5) = 4.44, p =
0.003], transitives [2.89%; t(5) = 1.88, p = 0.06], prepositional locative—
prepositional dative [1.77%; t(5) = 3.31, p = 0.01], locative-transitive [1.25%;
t(5) = 1.90, p = 0.06].
Further Tests
To better understand how the model architecture influenced priming,
we tested the models with learning in various sets of connections turned off.
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Fig. 6. A comparison of atomic- and nonatomic-role based message representations.Table IV shows the resulting proportions of total priming. Low proportions
mean that turning a connection off had a large effect on priming.
There are two things to note. First, the hidden-to-lexical connections did
not exert much influence. This implies that priming in the model did not de-
pend on lexical connections. Second, datives and transitives used the weights
differently. Although both structures depended on the production-context-to-
hidden weights, transitives relied more on the comprehension-context-to-
hidden weights whereas datives relied more on the message-to-hidden
weights. This points to different sources of priming for different constructions.
Another test addressed the time course of priming. One of the motiva-
tions for an implicit learning account of structural priming is evidence for the
persistence of priming over intervening sentences (Bock & Griffin, in press).
We evaluated the model’s performance over different lags between prime
and target sentences; Fig. 7 shows the results. For both datives and transi-
tives, structural priming endured over ten sequences. This lends credence to
the view that priming and learning can be rooted in the same mechanisms.
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Table IV. Proportion of Total Priming
Network connections Dative (%) Transitive (%)
Hidden ® lexical 91 100
Message ® hidden 13 45
Prod. Context ® hidden 14 8
Comp. Context ® hidden 91 45
Fig. 7. Modeling priming over intervening sentences for datives and transitives, using nonatomic
messages and comprehension-based representations.DISCUSSION
The connectionist architecture in which our learning and representa-
tional hypotheses was tested inherited many of its features from previous
accounts of the implicit learning of sequences. The results of our tests sug-
gest that similar architectural features may be applied in accounting for the
mechanisms of structural priming in language production. At the same time,
we are wary of claims that the entire range of syntactic phenomena in lan-
guage use can be adequately explained by simple recurrent networks.
The nature of models of this kind makes it difficult to explicitly define
the processes by which message representations are mapped into sequences
of constituents. Psycholinguistic tests of priming have pointed to influences
from the structure of the sequence (Bock & Loebell, 1990), from word
order (Hartsuiker, Kolk, & Huiskamp, 1999), from semantic features related
to sentience, like animacy (Bock et al., 1992), from verb repetition (Pickering
& Branigan, 1999), and from thematic roles (Hare & Goldberg, 1999). It is
part of the implicit learning hypothesis that multiple routes will show prim-
ing so long as those routes are necessary for language learning. In particu-
lar, we predict that priming will occur when alternatives share the ordering
of syntactic constituents, but differ in the mapping from message roles (as
in spray-load constructions; Chang, Bock, & Goldberg, in progress).
As this summary suggests, elections of sentence structures reflect a
contest among many factors. This, in turn, helps to explain why the learn-
ing associated with producing a single sentence can be responsible for struc-
tural priming. Sometimes the contest is close. When it is, the small weight
changes associated with learning the prime can tip the balance in favor of
the primed structure.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we developed and tested an account of structural priming
in terms of mechanisms for implicit learning. A computational model that
learned to map from messages to word strings—in other words, that learned
a small part of the task of language production—yielded priming from the
same mechanisms responsible for learning the mapping in the first place.
Two innovations were important to the model’s success. It used represen-
tations developed in the course of comprehension to help guide production.
In addition, it incorporated representations with nonatomic message roles,
which provided a better fit to data on structural priming than a more tradi-
tional atomic-role representation. Both of these features may help to illumi-
nate the nature of structural generalization, including the restrictions on
structural generalization that influence language learning and use.
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